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REVISION OF STATE BAIL LAWS
JOHN J. MU :-r*
Inspired perhaps by publicity associated with the federal revision of
bail laws,1 the success of privately funded release on own recognizance
projects in state courts, and the surfacing of bondsmen's activities in state
bail systems in newspapers and judicial opinions, state legislatures are cur-
rently taking a closer look at their bail laws. Since 1967 a few states'
have adopted revised bail laws that parallel the federal bail scheme.
This article identifies and examines some of the important elements in
the revision of state bail laws. Some of the matters discussed include the
paper nature of the accomplishments of some state revisions in the pre-
sumptive use of release on own recognizance, the problems associated with
the statutory commands to individualize the bail issue, the successful opera-
tion of the Illinois ten percent deposit form of bail with the consequence
of eliminating bail bondsmen from the Illinois bail system, and finally the
importance of understanding the managerial aspects of a state bail system
before revision so that the revision does not become a statutory cast beneath
which an unchanged state bail system operates. Considerable attention is
paid to the professional bail bondsman. Unique to the criminal processes
of only the United States and the Philippines,3 he remains at the core of
many state bail systems. This article illustrates the dilemma involved in
chipping away at his profits by setting limits over his heretofore largely un-
controlled operations and by introducing non-financial and more flexible
forms of bail, thereby reducing his business opportunities. The article
suggests that state bail revision should take an all or nothing approach to
the role of bondsmen, and supported by the experience of Illinois and the
recommendations of the American Bar Association,4 urges the "nothing"
approach. Among the elements of bail revision not discussed herein is the
problem of preventive detention, which has already been treated to consid-
erable recent discussion and empirical examination.5
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. The author wishes to record his gratitude to
the members of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, located in Chicago, and of the
office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County for their assistance in obtaining a statis-
tical description of the operation of the Illinois bail laws. He also appreciates the financial sup-
port of the Institute of Governmental Research of the University of Cincinnati, which made
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1 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146 et. seq. (Supp. 1I 1966).
2 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (Supp. 1970); ARIz. CIuM. CODE, § 13-1577 (Supp.
1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 763.16 (Supp. 1971); KANSAs CML CODE & PrOC. § 22-2802(1969).
3 ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pretrial
Release, § 5.4 (1968).
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I. THE TEN PERCENT DEPOSIT FORM OF BAIL
A. The What and Why of Ten Percent Deposit
The ten percent deposit form of state bail accepts the financial realities
of the current process of achieving pre-trial release in nearly all states. A
professional bail bondsman is usually paid ten percent of the amount of
bail listed on the bail schedule or set by a judicial officer, 6 and the bonds-
man, in turn, supplies one of the forms of bail recognized by the state law.'
That this model of pre-trial release predominates in state bail systems is
supported by published empirical evidence on the dependence of state bail
systems on bondsmen, the widespread use of bail schedules,8 and the charges
made by bondsmen for their services. Under the ten percent deposit form
of bail, the accused deposits ten percent of the total amount of the bail
with a state officer instead of the bondsmen, and all or ninety percent of the
deposit is returned to the accused on fulfillment of his court appearance ob-
ligations. The rationale supporting state adoption and full implementa-
tion of a ten percent deposit form is based upon the elimination of un-
necessary cost to the defendant of pre-trial release, the restoration of judi-
cial control over the bail system, and the elimination of bondsmen from the
bail system.
B. Restoring ludicial Control Over the State Bail System
Under the present model of bail predominating in most states, the
court's chore is setting the amount of bail. As one court said referring to
a jurisdiction then dependent on bondsmen, this is a relatively unimpor-
tant chore when an accused uses the services of a bondsman to achieve his
release.10 This is true because setting bail in these cases does not define
the defendant's real financial stake in fulfilling his court appearance obliga-
6United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 47 Cal.2d 384, 386, 303
P.2 d 1034, 1037 (1956); Hearings on S. 2839, and S. 2840 Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights and Subcomm. on Improvements in judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 164 (1964); see Nat'l Conference on Bail and Criminal
Justice, PROCEEDINGS 245 (1965). Bondsmen who act as agents for surety insurance com-
panies are bound by the filed rate of the company for which he acts as agent. See, e.g., OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.03 (A) (Page 1954). If the insurance company opts to affiliate with a
rating association, it must adhere to the filings by the association unless it files a deviated rate.
See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.06 (Page 1954). The National Surety Association is
licensed in most states as the rating association for ball bonds, and the rate filed by the Associa-
tion open to the public has been two percent of the amount of the bail bond. OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 3937.03 (A) (Page 1954). Most agents acting for surety companies licensed by the
Association charge a premium of ten percent and explain the excess (eight percent of the ball
bond) as a service charge. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 47
Cal.2d 384, 386, 303 P.2d 1034, 1035 (1956).
7 See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2937.22 (Page Supp. 1970).
8 Silverstein, Bail in the State Courts-A Field Study and Report, 50 M lNN. L. REv. 621
(1966).
9 Committee comments to ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
10 Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (concurring opinion).
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tion. The possible elements of this stake are the ten percent paid for the
bond, the amount of collateral or number of co-signers, if any, and the re-
corded obligation of the defendant as principal obligor to pay the amount
of the bail upon default. When a release is effectuated by a bondsman, the
court controls only a third of these elements and that element does not
involve the defendant's parting with any assets prior to his release. The
ten percent paid to the bondsman for the bond is non-refundable, and the
bondsman's decisions to demand collateral, or co-signers, or to set the
amount of collateral are completely uncontrolled by the court. 1 There-
fore, in a release effectuated by a bondsman, the court simply does not con-
trol the extent of the defendant's financial stake in returning to court.
By contrast, when a defendant provides bail by a deposit of his own
cash securities, the elements of his stake in returning to court are con-
trolled by the court in setting the bail amount. This also applies to a re-
lease by ten percent deposit.'2 The elements of the stake, known and con-
trolled by the court, are the ten percent deposit and the recorded obligation
to pay the amount of the bail upon default. Furthermore, the prospect of
return of the deposit introduces a financial inducement to the defendant
to appear for trial in all releases under this form of bail. This may also be
true in a release with collateral demanded by the bondsman, but as stated
previously, the decision to demand collateral is the bondsman's, not the
court's.
II. ELIMINATING BONDSMEN FROM THE
STATE BAIL SYSTEM
The major battle over the adoption and full implementation of a state
ten percent deposit form of bail centers on the retention or elimination of
the bondsmen as the cornerstone of state bail systems. Arguments for the
elimination of bondsmen often concentrate on the sins of bondsmen or
their suspected sins. Reports resulting from investigations by state attor-
neys general,13 grand juries,' 4 bar associations, 15 and newspapers' 6 are mo-
ll The only possible control over collateral demands of a bondsman arises out of a provision
in the Uniform Bail Bondsmen Licensing Act which requires a bondsman to file an affidavit
stating whether he received any security for his undertaking, and, if so, the nature and amount.
Uniform Bail Bondsmen Licensing Act, § 305, Nat'l Ass'n of Insurance Comm'rs, 1 PROCEED-
INGS 116 (1963). But the purpose of this provision is not to apprise the court at the time of
setting of a bail amount of what collateral is being demanded by the bondsman.
12Professor Bowman, the drafter of the Illinois legislation, has said that: "The 10-percent
provision is designed to restore the administration of bail to the courts... and to eliminate the
private professional bail bondsman from the criminal justice administrative processes." Hearings,
supra note 6.
13 Comm. of Penn., REPORT OF THE AF'rORNEY GENERAL ON THE INVESTIGATION OF
THE MAGISTERAL SYsTEm, Ch. X, at 304, 342 (1965).
14 Report of the Third February 1954 Grand Jury of New York County in 17 LAWYERS
GUILD REV. 149 (1957).
15 Funk, The Bondsman Problem, 19 KY. ST. B.J. 14 (1954); Sweet, Bail or Jail, 19 REcORD
OF N.Y.C.BA. 11 (1964).
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notonous in their repetition of the usual catalog of abuses such as fee
splitting with lawyers or court clerks, participating in the "fixing" of minor
criminal cases and charges in excess of the regulated rate. A New York
City Bar Association Report capped its description of bondsmen's influence
on the administration of criminal justice in this manner:
Whether demonstrably true or not, it is the belief of many, reached
through dose observation of the courts and their operation, that in an im-
perfect world the greatest danger of corruption of the administration of
criminal justice lies in the existence of the bondsman as part of that ad-
ministration. 17
One truth in this statement is that abuses in bondsmen's operations
rarely surface with enough visibility to permit complete analysis. When
the rare occasion arises, the state or city usually begins, or adds to, its list
of bondsmen's activities declared criminal and the purity of the bail system
is theoretically restored. For example, Tennessee has declared the fixing
of cases by bondsmen to be a criminal act.18 The Uniform Bail Bondsmen
Licensing Act, adopted now by at least seven states,"9 has a list of seven
acts deemed criminal and a stack of peccata for which a bondsman may
suffer a loss of license 20 Recently the alleged brutality of tracers hired
by a Columbus, Ohio, bondsman to retrieve an accused was highly publi-
cized" with the predictable consequence that an antidotal bill is currently
before the Ohio legislature which prohibits the use of force by bondsmen. 2
Michigan prohibits the exchange or receipt of money or property between
bondsmen and attorneys or court clerks for purposes of obtaining bail
bond business.23
In spite of all the criticism of bondsmen, they remain the central actors
in nearly all state bail systems.24 This is true because of the contention
that fees paid by individual defendants to bondsmen purchase for society a
private, highly efficient group of custodians of released defendants and re-
16 See, e.g., Christian Science Monitor, May 24, 1967, at 5, cols. 1-5; id. at 6, cols. 1-3; Cin-
cinnati Enquirer, Jan. 21, 1962, at 1, cols. 1-4; id. Jan. 22, 1962, at 1, cols. 3-8; id. Jan. 23, 19d2,
at 1, cols. 1-8; id., Jan. 24, 1967, at 1, cols. 1-6. See generally D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN
THE UNITED STATES 34-35 (1964).
17 Sweet, Bail or Jail, 19 REcoRD OF N.Y.CB.A. 11, 18 (1964).
18TNN. CODE ANN. § 40-1409 to 1411 (1955).
19 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-20-1 to -10 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1965); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 648.25-.57 (Supp. 1971); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3701 to 3738 (Supp. 1970);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.30-010 to -140 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 85A-1 to 34
(1965); OmrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1301-40 (1971); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. 958-22
(1967).
20 Uniform Act, supra note 11, at §§ 308, 401.
21 Columbus Dispatch, July 28, 1970, at 1B, cols. 2-5; id., July 29, 1970, at 8A, col. 3.
2 H.B. 777, 109th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. 1971-1972.
2
3 Mlc. COMP. LAws § 750.167(b) (1969).
24 Murphy, State Control of the Operation of Professional Bail Bondsmen, 36 U. CiN. L.
REv. 375, 400-401 (1967).
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trieving hunters of fugitive defendants-and all this without cost to society.
It seems minimally necessary for reformers of state bail systems to examine
this contention and balance the advantages and disadvantages to the admin-
istration of state criminal justice resulting from a state bail system depen-
dent upon bondsmen.
The last extensive study on the scope of control by bondsmen over
state bail systems was completed late in 1966 by the American Bar Founda-
tion.25 Although a few states have revised their bail laws since 1966,26
the statistics released in the study continue to be an impressive record of
the tight control bondsmen exercise over state bail systems. For example,
the study reported on bondsmen's activities in sections of Ohio-a state
which has not revised its bail laws since the study's publication, Bonds-
men effectuated seventy-eight percent of the releases in Columbus, Ohio,
and sLxty percent in Cincinnati.2 Another study in 1967 showed similar
results in the participation of bondsmen in the Cincinnati criminal pro-
cess.' Bondsmen strikes in New York in 1964 demonstrated the power of
bondsmen over that state's bail system"0 Tight enforcement policies on
forfeitures led to refusals to write bonds except on one-hundred per cent
collateral. The strike resulted in jailing numerous offenders and over-
crowding the city's prisons. 1
For each defendant released through the services of a bondsman, crimi-
nal justice administered to him usually costs a fee to a bondsman and a
fee for legal representation. The theory, of course, is that the fees paid
by defendants to bondsmen purchase for society a custodial and retrieval
function. Within the handful of reported cases on bondsmen's operations,
the proposition emerges that the bondsmen's interest in the release of a de-
fendant is predominantly financial. This point seems obvious, but it car-
ries with it a corollary: if that interest can be served by means other than
retrieving and surrendering the fugitive defendant, then the bondsman
usually makes no effort to satisfy the state's interest in the defendant's ap-
pearance for trial.32
25 Silverstein, Bail in the State Courts-A Field Study and Report, 50 MINN. L REv. 621
(1966) Appendix I, at 647-52.
26Supra note 2.
2 7 Through its Criminal Rules Advisory Committee, the Ohio Supreme Court is consider-
ing revision of procedural rules in criminal cases, including bail.
28 Silverstein, supra note 25 at 650.
2 0 Murphy, State Control of the Operation of Professional Bail Bondsmen, 36 U. CIN. L
RmV. 375, 379 (1967).
3 0 D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 27 (1964).
31 Id. at 28.
3 2 In Note, Bailbondsmen and the Fugitive Accused-The Need for Formal Removal Pro-
cedures, 73 YALE LJ. 1098 (1964), there is a report of interviews with bondsmen in which
the bondsmen state that some of their colleagues pursue bail-jumpers even where adequate se-
curity has been given by a third-party indemnitor "in order to maintain a reputation for re-
lentless pursuit as a general psychological deterrent to flight." Id. at 1106 n. 40.
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This is demonstrated by the facts found in McCaleb v. Peerless Insur-
ance Co.,33 a recent case where a bondsman actually ordered a defendant
to leave Nebraska one hour in advance of the defendant's appearance time
before an Omaha Municipal Court on traffic charges. Bail was set in the
amount of two-hundred dollars, and McCaleb purchased a bail bond from
a bondsman acting as agent for Peerless Insurance Co. without collateral
or a co-signing obligor. The bonding company discovered that McCaleb
left Omaha and was residing in California with relatives. A bonding agent
went to California, arrested McCaleb, gained control of McCaleb's car,
and for approximately four days took McCaleb on a series of trips through-
out California. McCaleb was placed in prisons at night, and at all other
times was shackled around his waist and wrists. 4
The purpose of these trips in California was to demand security for the
two-hundred dollars bond and payment of costs of retrieval from McCaleb's
relatives. These demands were unsuccessful and costs were increasing;
consequently, the bonding agent went back to Omaha with McCaleb in
McCaleb's car. The reason for the bondsman's retrieval efforts became
dear once the bondsman and the shackled McCaleb arrived in Omaha.
The bondsman promptly had McCaleb execute a bill of sale to his one-
year old car and sign a release of all claims. McCaleb was released from
custody and told to leave Nebraska. The bondsman never surrendered
McCaleb to the Court."
The issue raised in the case was the propriety of the four day detention
and shackling of McCaleb under a federal civil rights statute.36 Without
minimizing the importance of this issue, the facts dearly demonstrate that
the purpose of the arrest and detention of the fugitive McCaleb by the
bondsman was not to satisfy the state's interest in exposing McCaleb to
the criminal process, but rather for the advancement of the bondsman's
interest in financial protection from loss on the bond. In spite of claims
by some bondsmen to the contrary,3 7 it can reasonably be concluded that
in any case where a bondsman's financial interest in a bail bond is pro-
tected in advance by the signature of a reachable co-signing obligor or by
collateral, the state's interest in the appearance of the defendant counts
little.
The McCaleb case is one of the few published judicial records of the
touted custodial and retrieval functions by a bondsman. It is quite reason-
able to assume, however, that in a large number of releases effectuated
by bondsmen, the bondsmen's interest in financial self-protection and the
state's interest in the defendant's appearance do support each other. This
33250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965).
34 Id. at 514.
35Id. at 515.
36 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; see text infra at pp 459-462 for a discussion of this issue.
3 7 See note 32 supra.
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is demonstrated by releases where, in contrast with the McCaleb case,
neither full collateral nor a co-signing obligor is obtained before the ap-
pearance time of the defendant. In these cases, surrendering the defen-
dant to court is a method by which the bondsman can exonerate himself
of his financial obligation as surety on the bailbond or obtain a remission
of an outstanding judgment on a forfeited bond. The state's interest in the
appearance of the defendant is reinforced by the bondsmen's interest in
financial self-protection. This leads to a kind of "bounty-hunter" mythol-
ogy that supports the retention of bondsmen38 and which is detailed by
bondsmen when threatened by proposed legislation. One bondsman de-
scribed his manhunting capacity in this way:
In fact, we must locate the man. We do the tracking down. And there
is a lot to be done. We have monthly publications which go to all police
departments, all sheriff's offices. We run the man down.39
In addition to the McCaleb case, examples of the bondsmen's proce-
dures in "running the man down" have appeared in two other recent cases.
In Shine v. State,40 a "pistol-type" shotgun with an 18-inch barrel was used
in an attempt to retrieve a misdemeanant who had been sentenced by a
state court to pay a one-hundred dollar fine and costs. The purpose of the
retrieval was to exonerate the bondsman on an one-hundred dollar appeal
bond. In United States v. Trunko, 41 two bondsmen entered a house in the
middle of the night, forced their way into the room where the fugitive de-
fendant, his wife and children were sleeping, displayed a gun, and re-
trieved the defendant. The fugitive defendant had been charged with
traffic offenses.
The basic issue is whether the state's interest in ensuring the appearance
of defendants is well served through dependence upon a private retrieval
system of bondsmen. The relevant factors are: (1) the presence or ab-
sence of controls over the procedures used in a private retrieval system;
(2) the financial cost to defendants in the criminal process to support the
system; and, (3) the acid factor, experience in state bail systems operating
without the retrieval system of bondsmen.
III. THE ABSENCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
PRIVATE RETRIEVAL SYSTEM OF BONDSMEN
A. Source of Bondsmen's Power to Arrest
Most states by statute or court rule declare that the bondsman has the
power to arrest the defendant released on bail bond purchased from the
38 D. FRED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 30-31 (1964).
39 Hearings, supra note 6, at 181.
40 204 So. 2d 817 (Ala. 1967).
41 189 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
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bondsman and to surrender the defendant to custody of the sheriff or other
law enforcement officer.42 The arrest and surrender of the defendant can
be for the purpose of the bondsman's exoneration on a bond prior to the
court appearance time of the defendant or for remission of judgment on a
forfeited bond.
43
These statutes and rules essentially repeat the common law retrieval
power of bondsmen prevailing prior to their adoption.44 Taylor v. Tain-
tor,4r an 1873 decision, contains dicta which describes the common law
power of bondsmen:
When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody
of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprison-
ment. Whenever they choose to do so, they may seize him and deliver him
up in their discharge; and if that cannot be done at once, they may impri-
son him until it can be done. They may exercise their rights in person or
by agent. They may pursue him into another State; may arrest him on the
Sabbath; and if necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose.
The seizure is not made by virtue of new process. None is needed.40
This extraordinary power in the bondsmen is not derived from any
state power over the accused; rather, it arises from the private contractual
relationship between the accused and the bondsman as surety on the bail
bond contract. Fitzpatrick v. Williams 47 discussed the issue of the bonds-
man's right to seize a fugitive defendant in Louisiana and to transport him
to Washington, the state from which the accused had fled. The accused
was arrested in New Orleans on affidavits charging him with having com-
mitted an offense in Washington and with being a fugitive from justice.
The charges were dismissed by the New Orleans court but before the ac-
cused was released from the custody of the sheriff, the Washington bonds-
man intervened" and demanded custody of the accused. The court agreed
with the bondsman and repeated the proposition that the bondsman's right
is derived from his private relationship with the accused and is not derived
by subrogation to the rights of the state. The court said that this right to
arrest, imprison, and transport the accused can be exercised without resort
to legal process. The bondsman can exercise this right wherever he finds
4 2 See Appendix I for a compilation of the bondsmen's statutory power to arrest.
43See, e.g., FLt. STAT. ANN. §§ 903.22, 903.26(5)(d) (Supp. 1971-72).
4 4 The court in Cartee v. State, 162 Miss. 263 (1932), speaking of the statutes setting forth
the bondsmen's power to arrest, said, ' These sections are, in substance, declaratory of the com-
mon law." Id. at 272.
45 Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1873).
461d, at 371.
47 46 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931).
4 8 The procedure in Fitzpatrick is unclear. Apparently the defendant sought a writ of
habeas corpus in a federal district court after charges had been dismissed by the state court, and
the state sheriff refused to release the defendant. The bondsmen intervened in the hearing on
whether the writ should issue.
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the accused needing "... no process, judicial or administrative, to seize
[the accused) .... ,49
The court concluded its description of the absence of judicial or admin-
istrative control over the bondsman's power to arrest, imprison, and trans
port an accused over state lines by comparing this power with that of the
state. Predictably, the state placed second to the bondsmen. The state
must go through extradition procedures-but not the bondsmen.
The right of the surety to recapture his principal is not a matter of
criminal procedure, but arises from the private undertaking implied in the
furnishing of the bond.... It is not a right of the state but of the surety.
If the state desires to reclaim a fugitive from its justice, in another ju-
risdiction, it must proceed by way of extradition in default of a voluntary
return.50
B. Legality of Bondsman's Arrest and Detention Power
The arrest and custody power of bondsmen is a degenerate vestige of a
bail relationship between defendant and surety that either perished or
never gained footing in this country. Bail was a transfer of custody of a
defendant awaiting trial from the sheriff to a third party who had a per-
sonal, not a pecuniary, interest in the defendant. 1 The emphasis was on
the personal stake of the third party in the interests of the defendant and
the actual custodial efforts of the third party. It was a system based on
trust and confidence rather than commercialism. The closest present day
analogy would be a release of a defendant to the custody of his family, or
a social agency, where this form of bail is authorized by state law.52 Em-
phasis on a personal rather than commercial relationship between the de-
fendant and third party continues to have vitality in England. The fur-
nishing of bail for profit is illegal and there are no professional bail bonds-
men in England. Agreements to indemnify the third party for any pay-
ment he must make to the court caused by the non-appearance of the de-
fendant are illegal.53
The states have capitulated to bail systems where the interest of the
third party in producing the defendant can be, and often is, profit only.
Contracts to indemnify the third party for losses caused by the failure of
40 Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 41 (5th Cir. 1931).
5o Id. at 40.
51F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 589-90 (2d ed. 1968);
Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE LJ. 966 (1961). "Bail originated with
the practice of releasing the defendant in the custody of his family or friends, who undertook to
guarantee his court appearance. They generally minimized their risk by acting as private jailers."
Arez & Struz, Bail and the Indigent Accused, 8 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 12, 13 (1962).
52 ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b)(1) (Supp. 1970).
53 Nat'l Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, PIocEEDiNGs 339-40 (1964); see Note,
Indemnification Contracts in the Law of Bail, 35 VA. L REV. 496, 497-500 (1949).
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the defendant to appear have been held valid.54 One dissenting judge in
Carr v. Davis,55 a West Virginia case holding valid a contract to indemnify
the bondsman, stated clearly the shift of bail in the states from a system
of actual custody and control based upon a personal relationship between
the defendant and the third party to one based upon impersonal, financial
interests.
Public policy and the law demand a different decision.... The rich-
est man, for whom those knowing him would not vouch without indem-
nity, should not be allowed to furnish bail by virtually purchasing it. The
mere fact that indemnity is furnished indicates that confidence is not re-
posed. Bail is a matter of confidence and personal relation. 58
In addition to the disappearance of any personal relationship between
the defendant and the surety-for-profit, the assumed custodial efforts and
dominion by the surety-for-profit over the defendant during the period of
the release are simply non-existent. The theory that a bail release is a con-
tinuation of the defendant's original imprisonment, as stated in the Taylor
case,57 is based on the assumption that the surety will take a personal in-
terest in the behavior and appearance obligation of the released defendant.
This is not so. Caleb Foote, who has added much to the understanding of
bail law by empirical studies,58 calls bondsmen's claims to any significant
custodial services "frivolous." 59  The number of persons released on bail
through the services of bondsmen is too great to permit any extensive cus-
todial efforts by bondsmen, 0 and the only extensive study of the practices
of bondsmen found that their custodial efforts are limited to "an occasional
phone call, letter, or 'grapevine' rumor."61
The dissenting judge in Car' failed to point to the most intolerable
consequence of the passing of bail as a matter of actual dominion and per-
sonal relation to that of commercialism. The power of the third party
to arrest and detain has continued and when now executed by a bondsman
serves his commercial interest. The professional bail bondsmen, by defini-
5 4 See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 224 U.S. 567 (1912). Louisiana, one of the last hold-
outs for the invalidity of indemnification contracts, changed its mind by statute in 1966. IA.
CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art, 332 (West. 1966).
55 64 W. Va. 522, 63 S.Y. 326 (1908).
56 Id. at 535,63 S.E. at 331 (dissenting opinion).
57 See text supra at 458.
58 Foote, Introduction: The Cornparative Study of Conditional Release, 108 U. PA. L REv.
290 (1960); Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia,
102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1954). See also Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II,
113 U. PA. L. REv. 1125, 1162 (1965).
59
' The claims that bondsmen provide any significant function in policing those on bail and
finding them once they have absconded seem frivolous to me. There is no evidence that they
actually perform any significant custodial function, and it is unreasonable to expect them to do so."
Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125, 1162 (1965).
60 Foote, Introduction: Comparative Study of Conditional Release, 108 U. PA. L .REV. 290,
300 (1960).
01 D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (1964).
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tion, provides bail for a fee.62  His relationship, as commercial surety,
with the defendant as principal obligor on the bail bond, is essentially that
of a creditor to debtor.
In a recent case, where bondsmen's activities surfaced for judicial scru-
tiny, the bondsman was found by the court to have used his arrest and de-
tention powers to collect a private debt of forty dollars owed by the de-
fendant.3 In this case, the defendant had purchased an appearance bond
from the bondsman, appeared at trial, was convicted of a misdemeanor and
sentenced to pay a one-hundred dollar fine and costs of nineteen dollars.
The bondsman paid the fine and costs and then sold an appeal bond to the
defendant. The defendant paid some money to the bondsman, leaving
a debt of forty dollars. The court found that the bondsman took the fol-
lowing steps to collect his forty dollars. The bondsman and two armed
agents went to their debtor's home at 5:00 a.m., displayed guns to the
debtor, surrounded the home, and started to kick at the back and front
doors. The front door broke, and the bondsman's agent thrust his shotgun
through it. At that point, the debtor shot and killed the agent. Shine,
the debtor, was arrested and charged with second-degree murder on affi-
davit of the bondsman which recited the Alabama statutory authority of
bondsmen to arrest. Shine was convicted and sentenced to 15 years impris-
onment. The appellate court reversed, noting that, "[T]his 'pay or get
shot' attitude has too long been allowed to flourish with bonding com-
panies."" Concerning the state statutory arrest and detention power of
bondsmen, the court held that the purpose of this law was not to aid in
the collection of private debts of the bonding company no matter what
the origin of the debt.
The Code cannot and must not be construed to license company offi-
ials to run around the countryside armed with ... shotguns and pistols,
in an effort to collect their personal debts .... The proper procedure for
enforcing collection of a debt is not by means of an armed posse descend-
ing upon the debtor at 5:00 a.m. in his own domicile.6 5
The McCaleb case, which was discussed earlier,6 6 is an astounding
example of a bondsman using his power to arrest, shackle, and detain a
defendant for four days to serve only the bondsman's financial interest in
a bail bond. Once the bondsman satisfied his commercial interest through
his state-bestowed power to arrest and detain, the defendant was released
and told not to appear at court.
02 The terms "bondsmen" and "professional bail bondsmen" are used interchangeably in
this Article and refer to a person who provides bail for a fee by using his own assets or by act-
ing as an agent for a surety company.
63 Shine v. State, 204 So. 2d 817 (Ct. App. Ala. 1967).
64 Id. at 826.
6 Id.
60 See text supra, at 456.
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The above discussion is relevant to the question which is basic to the
revision of state bail bond law: should compensated sureties be continued in
the state bail system? The American Bar Association's minimum stan-
dards for criminal justice, approved in 1968 by the House of Delegates,
recommended, without qualification, the prohibition of compensated sure-
ties.0 7 The A.B.A. also urges adoption of a rule that in any action to
enforce an indemnity agreement between a principal and a surety on a
bail bond, it should be a complete defense that the surety acted for com-
pensation. 8 The A.B.A.'s position is that the professional bail bondsman
is an anachronism in the state criminal process and is an intolerable threat
to civil liberties. The A.B.A. believes that the state's interest in the ap-
pearance of the defendant can be served by other forms of bail, such as
the ten percent cash deposit.69
C. Bondsmen's Power To Execute Distant Retrievals
Apart from the legislative question of whether commercial sureties
should be prohibited in the criminal process, or phased out through the de-
velopment of other forms of bail not requiring commercial sureties, such
as ten percent deposit, one frequently occurring application of the law au-
thorizing bondsmen to arrest and detain seems to be constitutionally in-
valid. The factual situation in which this problem arises is the bondsman's
arrest of a defendant leading to a lengthy detention and transportation
over great distances from the place of the arrest to the place of surrender.
Arrest and distant transportation occurred in the facts of many of the
cases that discuss bondsmen's operations. United States v. Trunko70 in-
volved arrest and transportation from Arkansas to Ohio; McCaleb, Cali-
fornia to Nebraska; Fitzpatrick, Louisiana to Washington; Thomas v.
Miller,71 Cincinnati to Tennessee; Gola v. State,72 Pennsylvania to Dela-
ware. A recent distant retrieval from West Virginia to Ohio received con-
siderable newspaper publicity because of alleged brutality by the bondsmen
in the course of transportation.73
The difficulty in these distant retrievals is the absence of any required
initial limited hearing to protect individuals from the expense and conse-
quential hardship of being forcibly transported great distances when there
is a mistake in identity, or when the accusation of criminal conduct is pat-
ently frivolous or mistaken. Furthermore, there is no initial protection
6 7 ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pretrial
Release, § 5.4 (1968).
68Id.
69 Id. at 64-65.
70 189 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Ark. 1960); see also cases cited at Annot., 73 A.L.R. 1370 (1931).
71282 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
72 135 A.2d 137 (Del. 1957).
73 Columbus Dispatch, supra note 21.
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from the bondsman's use of his power to arrest and transport for purposes
other than court appearance.74 That there is need for this type of limited
hearing is demonstrated by the recent cases where courts have found that
bondsmen used their arrest and transportation power for purposes other
than production of defendants in court. With the exception of California,75
no state appears to require any judicial or administrative process during
the course of a retrieval by a bondsman. There has been one suggestion70
for amelioration of this problem in distant retrievals by bondsmen through
application of the formal procedures of the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Ac 7 for arrests and interstate transportation of defendants by bondsmen,
but there is no evidence of acceptance of this suggestion by any state.
The requirement of an initial limited hearing was raised in 1957 in a
Delaware case 8 but the theory required to support this requirement missed
the mark. The case arose on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a
Delaware state prisoner in a state court alleging that he had been illegally
transported to Delaware from Pennsylvania because he had not waived
extradition nor had extradition been sought by Delaware. The court called
the prisoner's claim "fanciful" and lacking in "even a fairly debatable point
of argument, '7 9 and held that no extradition was necessary since the arrest
in Pennsylvania was by agents of his bondsmen. According to the court,
such an arrest was not an action by the state and, therefore, no extradition
was required. The facts of the arrest in Pennsylvania suggest that the
petitioner's claim was not as fanciful as the court claimed. The arrest in
Pennsylvania was by two Delaware police officers acting as agents of a
Delaware bondsman. The extent to which the police officers used symbols
of their office to obtain custody of the petitioner is not stated in the opin-
ion, but this point might have been developed to show that the arrest was
by the bondsmen's agents acting under color of Delaware law.80
The argument of the petitioner was quite understandable when the
power of bondsmen to arrest and transport defendants over great distances
is compared with that of federal and state law enforcement agencies. Ar-
rest and removal of a defendant by federal agents to a distant district for
trial is controlled by Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The rule applies generally to cases where the arrest would result in trans-
7 4 Shine v. State, 204 So.2d 817 (Ct. App. Ala. 1967). McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., 250
F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965).
7 5 CAL. PENAL CODE 847.5 (1970).
7 GNote, Bailbondsmen and the Fugitive Accused-The Need for Formal Removal Proce-
dures, 73 YALE LJ. 1098 (1964).
7 7 Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 9 U.L.A. 263 (1957).
78 Gollav. Delaware, 50 Del. 497, 135 A.2d 137 (1957).
79 Id. at 501, 135 A.2d at 139.
8
oSce, e.g., United States v. Trunko, 189 P. Supp. 559 (E.D. Ark. 1960) where the court
found arrest action by bondsman was under color of state law when bondsman showed his
Ohio Deputy Sheriff's badge to effectuate the arrest.
19711
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
porting the defendant more than one hundred miles to the point of trial.8 '
In such cases, the rule requires that federal arresting officers take the de-
fendant "without unnecessary delay" to the nearest available magistrate
or judge in the district in which the arrest occurs for a hearing on whether
an order should issue authorizing the distant removal or discharge of the
defendant. The issues at the hearing are quite limited; if the removal is
based upon an indictment, the federal government need only produce a
certified copy of the indictment and proof of identity. If the removal is
based only upon a complaint or information, reasonable cause to believe
the defendant guilty must be adduced.u
The drafters of Rule 40 recognized that it seemed illogical to require an
extradition-type procedure to remove a fugitive from one federal distict to
a distant one, since the entire United States is a single jurisdiction from
the point of view of the Federal Government, 83 and a federal arrest war-
rant runs through the United States." But it was felt that ". . . in view of
the long distances that are at times involved, some supervision and restric-
tions seem desirable on the transportation of an accused person from one
part of the country to another."85  The minimal hearing prevents cost
and burden of distant transportation upon an individual where the charge
against him is frivolous or mistaken, or where he is not the person against
whom the charge was made.
Although the Rules are applicable to "all criminal proceedings"88 in
federal courts, no reported judicial decision has discussed the applicability
of the minimal removal hearings in Rule 40 to transportation by bonds-
men of defendants over great distances to a federal district court for trial.
The practice of bondsmen is to ignore Rule 40 in conducting distant re-
movals in federal criminal matters.87 What the law says is minimally nec-
essary for federal law enforcement officers engaged in distant removals
does not apply to similarly occupied bondsmen.
Bondsmen acting on the express or implied88 authority of a bail con-
81 For a statement of the scope of Rule 40, see 8 A J. MOORB, FEDERAL PRAcricE 5 40.01
at 40-4 (2d ed. 1967).
8 2 
"[TMhe distinction reflects the fact that in the case of an indictment, the grand jury, an
independent body, 'which is an arm of the court,' has already found probable cause.... In the
case of a complaint or information, no such determination has been made and, therefore, separate
proof of reasonable cause is required. In either case, the defendant is entitled to a judicial hear-
ing in the asylum district." Note, Bailbondsmen and the Fugitive Accused-The Need for For-
mal Removal Procedures, 73 YALE L.J. 1098, 1104 a. 30 (1964).
83 Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 3 F.R.D. 445, 450 (1944).
8 4 FED. R. CRm. P. 4(c)(2) see 8 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACricE 5 4.04[3], at 4-20 (1970).
8 5 Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 12 GEo. WASH. L Rlv. 119, 128
(1944). Prof. Holtzoff was Secretary of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure that drafted Rule 40.
86 FED. R. CRMr. P. 1.
87 Interview with Judge Max Schiffman, Magistrate, Federal District Court for Eastern Dis-
trict of New York.
8 8 1n Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931) the bondsmen's power to arrest
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tract are also largely immune from judicial control in interstate removal of
individuals accused of state crimes.89 By comparison, state officers, visibly
acting under the authority of the state, are bound by the Uniform Extra-
dition Act which has been adopted by all but four states. 0 The Act re-
quires a removal hearing limited to issues similar to Rule 40 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. In addition to the social goal of inter-
state harmony, state extradition laws do protect against improvident distant
removals based on mistake or insubstantial grounds." Although official
kidnapping by state police officers was reported two decades ago,92 state
law enforcement officers presently do seem to comply with the extradition
statutes.
To place the same responsibility on bondsmen that currently applies to
federal and state officers in distant retrievals does not require that Rule 40
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Uniform Extradition
Act be held applicable to arrests and distant removals by bondsmen
through process of rule or statutory interpretation. The minimum proce-
dural requirements of the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitu-
tion should apply to arrests and distant removals by bondsmen. Conse-
quently, defendants should have a constitutional right to a limited hearing
prior to distant removals to guard against the costs and burdens to de-
fendants caused by overreaching bondsmen, mistakes in identity and re-
movals based on insubstantial charges. The basis of this theory is that
retrieval of defendants for trial by bondsmen is action by the state, in view
of the public function performed by bondsmen and state participation in
bondsmen's retrieval activities. In addition, the interest of the defendant
in guarding against the consequences of an improvident distant removal is
cognizable under the fourteenth amendment through the requirement of a
hearing limited in scope to appropriate protection of that interest.
The necessity of a hearing is supported by Goldberg v. Kelly,94 and Bell
and cross state lines was based upon an implied promise on the part of the defendant not to
leave the state where the bail bond was written.
80 Note, Bailbondsmen and the Fugitive Accused--The Need for Formal Removal Proce-
dures, 73 YALE L.J. 1098, 1100 (1964).
9 0 See 9 U.L.A. 143 (Curn. Ann. Pocket Part 1967) for a list of states that have adopted
the Uniform Extradition since 1967. Louisiana and Nevada adopted the Act since 1967 leav-
ing only Mississippi, North Dakota, South Carolina and Washington as the four remaining
states that have not adopted the Act. As an alternative to bondsmen's distant retrievals without
hearings, The Uniform Rendition of Accused Persons Act, adopted by two states, permits the
pursuing state to bypass extradition by obtaining a court order directing immediate return of
the accused. See Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1967 HANDBOOK 153 (1967).
91 Ex parte Parker, 390 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965); State ex rel. Foster v. Uttech,
31 Wis.2d 664, 143 N.W.2d 500 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 956; see United States ex tel.
McCline v. Meyering, 75 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1934).
92See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Note, Illegal Abductions by State Police:
Sanctions for Evasion of Extradition Statutes, 61 YA.E L.J. 445, 448 (1952).
9 3 Note, Bailbondsmen and the Fugitive Accused-The Need For Formal Removal Proce-
dures, 73 YALE L.J. 1098, 1100 n.16 (1964).
94 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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v. Burson,5 two recent Supreme Court decisions requiring limited hear-
ings prior to a license suspension of an uninsured driver involved in an
accident and prior to the termination or reduction of public assistance. In
both cases the court stressed the unfortunate practical consequences to the
driver or welfare recipient of a loss of license or welfare caused by mistake
or action based on insubstantial grounds.
The argument that bondsmen act as private agents and that their ar-
rest and detention powers are based exclusively on a bail contract with
the defendant, honors form and ignores substance. The bondsmen occupy
an essential role in the criminal processes of most states and their activities
intertwine with the state interest in pre-trial release and appearance of de-
fendants. In the arrest and return of a fugitive defendant, the bondsman
operates as a de facto agent of the state in that the purpose of his pursuit,
the arrest and transportion of the defendant, is to expose the defendant to
the state criminal process." This is identical to the goal of state police of-
ficers involved in retrieval of fugitive defendants or interstate retrieval
through extradition procedures.
The Supreme Court has, in two major cases, 7 held that under some
circumstances private activity may, at least for fourteenth amendment pur-
poses, be treated as state activity where the private activity is satisfying a
public function. One case involved pamphleteering in a company owned
town9" and the other, picketing on a porch and parcel zone of a super-
market.99 The actions of the company town and supermarket in prohibit-
ing the pamphleteering and picketing were found to be subject to proscrip-
tions of the first amendment applied through the fourteenth amendment
against state interference with speech. Countervailing in both cases against
the application of the fourteenth amendment was the argument that the
company town and supermarket were exercising through their trespass ac-
tions one of the major incidents of private property ownership-the right
to tell others to stay off their property. The private interests of the bonds-
men is far less weighty. It arises out of a bail bond contract where the
obligation of the obligor-defendant and the bondsman-surety is owed to
the state and the core of the bargain is exposure of the defendant to the
criminal processes of the state.
It is true that an individual bondsman in one distant retrieval case
95 39 U.S.L.W. 4607 (U.S. May 14, 1971).
96This theory has been expressed for purposes of applying the Uniform Extradition Act to
distant retrievals by bondsmen and not for purposes of applying the Fourteenth Amendment.
Note, Bailbondsmen and the Fugitive Accused-The Need for Formal Removal Proceedures, 73
YALB L.J. 1098 (1964).
97 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Amalgam. Food Employees Union Local 590
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
98 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
99 Amalgam. Food Employees Union Local 509 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968).
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weighs little quantitatively in the total exercise of the state interest in the
production of defendants. But the measurement of state action in any
case of arrest and detention by bondsmen should include the extensive
control the professional bail bonding interest exerts in state criminal pro-
cesses. 10 Added to the public function performed by bondsmen which
shows the application of the fourteenth amendment, is the participation'01
by the state in the retrieval activities of the bondsmen. City or state pri-
sons are used by bondsmen as hostels for their captives during periods of
distant transportation. For example in McCaleb v. Peerless Insurance
Co.102 the bondsman housed his captive in jails when necessary during their
four day trip through California and finally to Nebraska. This is a usual
practice of bondsmen as demonstrated by the cases on bondsmen's opera-
tions and its source lies in the common law powers of bondsmen to
imprison defendants in the course of retrieval.
D. Absence of Remedy for Illegal Seizure, Detention or
Force by Bondsmen
The difficulty of obtaining a remedy for an illegal seizure and distant
removal by bondsmen is another sign of the lack of accountability within
which bondsmen operate. The rule has been that an illegal seizure of the
accused does not provide a basis for objecting to the state's jurisdiction in
a subsequent criminal trial.10 3  The rule has been criticized by commen-
tators1 4 because it does not operate to deter illegal activity, but the criti-
cism has not found its way, as yet, into the cases. One approach is the
application of the Federal Kidnapping Act,10 which prohibits the inter-
state transportion of illegally seized persons. But even the federal govern-
ment has been unsuccessful in its one attempt to apply a criminal sanction
to bondsmen's activities found by the court to be "high-handed, unreason-
able and oppressive."'' 0
According to the court, two Ohio bondsmen burst through the door
of a home in Arkansas before dawn one morning, pushed by the eighty-
one-year-old homeowner and entered a bedroom occupied by a man, his
wife and baby, flashing a light in the eyes of the man-the sleeping object
of their interstate search. The bondsmen displayed a gun, forced the man
into an automobile, handcuffed him, and drove away at a terrific rate of
100 In the Amalgam. Food case, the court set out the extensive control (37%) over retail
sales exercised by supermarkets as relevant to the state action issue. Id. at 324.
101 One of the lead cases on "state participation" as a factor bearing on the state action issue
is Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
102 250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965).
103 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
104 See, e.g., Pitler, 'The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF.
L. Rev. 579, 600 (1968).
105 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964).
100 United States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559, 565 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
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speed to Ohio, ignoring the pleas of their prisoner's wife to communicate
with the sheriff of the local county in Arkansas. All of this was done to
secure the remission of a five hundred dollar misdemeanor bond." 7
The federal government prosecuted the bondsmen for willfully depriv-
ing the man, under color of state law, of his right not to be deprived of
his liberty without due process-the criminal counterpart 08 of the federal
civil rights statute. The court found that the activities of the bondsmen
violated the man's counstitutional right and that these activities were per-
formed under color of state law.109 But the prosecution's case faltered on
the proposition that the bondsmen did not have the specific criminal in-
tent to violate constitutional rights and as support the court cited the bonds-
men's testimony that a "bond jumper" had no civil rights during arrest and
return." 0
A similar action, but civil in theory, based upon a federal civil rights
statute"' involved the automobile transportion of a fugitive from Cincin-
nati to Tennessee. The fugitive's legs were chained, his hands handcuffed,
and the court stated that he had been treated "roughly, if not cruelly.""'
But again, the bondsmen were held not to be civilly liable because they
"were acting by reason of a contractual relationship with him [the fugi-
five]."" 3 Both cases suggested state tort actions against the bondsmen.
"If plaintiff has a right of action for cruel and inhuman treatment against
... his bonding company, it is a state court action."114 This is a hollow sug-
gestion in that, with one exception; 115 no recent case has been reported
where a bondsman has been sued successfully under any civil theory for
recovery against oppressive activities in retrieving individuals.
It is fair to conclude that there is no system of accountability in bonds-
men's arrest and detention activities, and there are no clear rules on the
amount of force bondsmen may use during the course of an arrest and
detention of a fugitive. The bondsman's immunity to legal processes, per-
mitting him to pursue his commercial interests in the bail bond contract,
is truly startling when compared with the settled rules restricting activities
107 Id.
108 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
'
09 The conclusion that the activities were under color of state law was decided on the nar-
row facts that one of the bondsmen held a deputy sheriff commission in Ohio and that he dis-
played his badge to the man at the time of the arrest. United States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp.
559, 562 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
110 United States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559, 565 (E.D. Ark. 1960).
"ll Thomas v. Miller, 282 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
1121d. at 572.
13id. at 573.
311d. at 572.
"15McCaleb v. Peerless Ins. Co., 250 F. Supp. 512 (D. Neb. 1965). One court denied a
motion by a bondsman to dismiss a complaint under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 brought by an accused
for an alleged beating by the bondsman during a retrieval, Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D.
Pa. 1970).
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of police officers in conducting arrests, retrieving defendants after arrest,
and retrieving fugitives after prison escapes. In arresting a misdemean-
ant,"0 or retrieving a misdemeanant after arrest" 7 or prison break," 8 the
officer may not, absent a problem of self-defense, use firearms and is sub-
ject to civil or criminal sanctions for disregarding this rule. The rule is
based on the view that, "It is better that he (the misdemeanant defendant
eluding arrest or escaping from prison) be permitted to escape altogether
than that his life be forfeited, while unresisting, for such a trivial of-
fense.""' 9 A court expressed that view in remanding for trial a wrongful
death action by the father of a prison fugitive who was shot by a guard as
he was running away from a prison work detail. The prisoner was serv-
ing a sentence for carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor in the local
jurisdiction. In another case, an Ohio police chief has been convicted of
discharging fire arms for shooting a pistol in an attempt to apprehend a
misdemeanant.uo In convicting a police officer for criminal assault and
battery in the use of firearms in apprehending a man for molesting a girl,
a New Jersey court said,
Police officers must learn, if they are not already aware, that there are
definite limitations upon the amount of force that may be used in arresting
a citizen with a crime ... ; that they may be held liable, both civilly and
criminally, for the use of excessive force either in making a lawful arrest
or in attempting to capture a fleeing offender...121
IV. THE DILEMMA IN IMPOSING CONTROLS
OVER BONDSMEN'S OPERATIONS OR
RETAINING BONDSMEN AND EXPANDING THE
NONCOMMERCIAL FORMS OF BAIL
Proposals for controls over bondsmen's activities are now quite fash-
ionable. Ohio presently is considering a prohibition of force, or the threat
of force, in retrieving defendants.' In addition, Ohio is considering
a statutory encouragement of the use of one bond in felony cases from
preliminary hearing and arraignment through trial, 23 with the conse-
quence that bondsmen will receive only one premium in a felony release
instead of his usual two. Consistent with the purpose of most state leg-
islation dealing with bondsmen, this proposed legislation, particularly the
prohibition against force, is responsive to a report of a bondsman's use of
116 See, e.g., State v. Elder, 120 N.E.2d 508 (Zanesville Mun. Ct. Ohio 1953); State v. Mc-
Lean, 49 N.E.2d 778 (Ct. App. Ohio 1942).
117 See, e.g., Rischer v. Meehan, 11 Ohio C.C.R. 403 (Columbiana Co. Cir. Ct. 1896); No-
back v. Town of Montclair, 33 N.J. Super. 420, 110 A.2d 339 (1954).
118 Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185,136 S.E. 375 (1927).
19Id. at 189, 136 S.E. at 377.
120 State v. Elder, 120 N.E.2d 508 (Zanesville Mun. Cr. Ohio 1953).
121 Noback v. Town of Montclair, 33 N.J. Super. 420, 428, 110 A.2d 339, 343 (1964).
122 H.B. 777, 109th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. 1971-1972.
12 31d.
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force which surfaced in the local press.' 24 California now requires bonds-
men to obtain a warrant before arresting a fugitive.,25 The Uniform
Bail Bondsman Licensing Act adopted now by at least seven states 2 6 con-
tains a comprehensive skein of prohibited acts, licensing requirements and
required record keeping on fee and collateral demands by bondsmen-all
of which has been passed for the benefit of revisers of bail bond laws.127
Although the Uniform Act is silent on the bondsmen's retrieval powers, it
shares with other less comprehensive legislative regulation of bondsmen
the dilemma of approaching the problem of the bondsmen in the criminal
process through legislative controls.
The cumulative effect of controls over bondsmen's operations, espe-
cially of the variety proposed in Ohio-although desirable in se-make
the business of bondsmen more burdensome to operate, more visible
through reporting requirements, and most probably less profitable. The
result is likely to be a serious erosion of the elan of the bondsmen as a
bounty hunter. Furthermore, constricting the operations of bondsmen
which until recently were free from any type of control, is likely to re-
sult in a reduction of the number of persons for whom the bondsmen
will write bail bonds. The same reasoning applies to the extension of
judicial controls over bondsmen, as suggested in this article, including the
suggestion that distant retrieval by bondsmen include a prior judicial hear-
ing. The bondsmen would have to absorb out-of-pocket expenses in-
curred through the hearing requirement so long as he had no method to
assert a claim for reimbursement.
This dilemma, inherent in the extension of statutory or judicial controls
over bondsmen, is best demonstrated by the consequences of the occa-
sional, highly publicized forfeitures by judges of one-hundred percent of
defaulted bail bonds. This represents an assault in extremis on the finan-
cial interests of bondsmen, and the resulting strike by New York City
bondsmen and the consequence of bulging prisons is illustrative of the ex-
pected result.128
An identical problem has appeared in jurisdictions that have recently
revised their bail laws to include a broader range of noncommercial forms
of bail. Wisconsin revised its bail laws in July of 1970 to provide for re-
lease without bail or on an unsecured appearance bond in misdemeanors; 29
in felonies the release is by unsecured appearance bond.80 In place of the
124 See, Columbus Dispatch, July 28, 1970 at lB, Cols. 2-5.
125 CAL. PENAL CODE § 847.5 (1970).
126 Murphy, State Control of the Operation of Professional Bail Bondsmen, 36 U. CIN. L.
REv. 375, 391 (1967).
127 d. at 391-400.
3 28 See text supra at 455.
12 9 WIs. STAT. § 969.02 (1971).
13 0 WIs. STAT. § 969.03 (1971).
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aforementioned types of releases, the judge may utilize a variety of other re-
leases including the ten percent deposit and the commercial bail bond. This
broader flexibility in the forms of bail represents another threat to the eco-
nomic interests of bondsmen. Since the adoption of these changes ten
percent deposit has been used in at least thirty percent of the felony cases
in Milwaukee, and there has been an increase in the use of unsecured
personal bonds. 3' The result has been that the defendants who pose little
risk of nonappearance have been siphoned away from the business oppor-
tunities of bondsmen and the bondsmen are, consequently, more selective
in writing bonds. The danger, of course, is that some people will not be
released through this system who would have been released through the
system that prevailed prior to the bail law change.
A similar situation has occurred in the District of Columbia. The
Federal Bail Reform Act with its emphasis on release on personal rec-
ognizance and range of alternative conditional releases, including those of
a noncommercial nature, has not eliminated bondsmen but has diverted
much business away from bondsmen. The diminishing business opportun-
ities for bondsmen has meant that bondsmen are unwilling to write bail
bonds with a face amount of less than three thousand dollars because of
the need to make a high economic return for each bond written. As a
consequence, there are individuals who cannot now achieve pre-trial release
in the District simply because the economic return to the bondsmen in
writing the bond is not high enough.132  This includes persons selected by
the court for release by bail with surety in an amount lower than three
thousand dollars.
Revision of state bail laws, at a minimum, should result in the pre-
trial release of as many persons and with as much expeditiousness as pre-
vailed prior to the revision. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate the im-
pact of a proposed revision on the bondsmen's operations, taking into ac-
count that the raison d'etre of bondsmen is profit. This is especially true in
the large number of states where the bondsmen currently effectuate a sub-
stantial number of pre-trial releases. Another consideration is whether
the state bail system could operate without commercial sureties, relying on
other forms of bail such as conditional release, release on own recogniz-
ance, and ten percent cash deposit. Such a system relies for its retrieval
processes on federal and state law enforcement agencies that have already
developed cooperative practices to apprehend state fugitive felons in inter-
state flight cases. 33 The experience since 1964 of Illinois, the first state to
'31 Source of this information is Donald Thorgaard, Ass't Deputy Clerk for the Second Cir-
cuit, Criminal Division, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
132 The source of the information is Bruce Beaudin, Director, District of Columbia Bail
Agency. See also District of Columbia Bail Agency, Second Annual Report 10 (1968).
133 8A J. MfooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE 5 40.05, at 40-17, 40-18 (1970).
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authorize the use of the ten percent deposit as a form of bail, demon-
states that a state bail system can operate effectively without bondsmen. 34
V. STATE RECOGNITION OF TEN PERCENT DEPOSIT
Since 1966 at least six states 35 have expressly authorized, as a form of
bail, the deposit with the court clerk of a sum not to exceed ten percent
of the amount of the bond. A revision of New York's bail laws, effective
September 1, 1971, includes a "partially secured appearance bond" as one
of the authorized forms of bail."3" This is defined as a "bail bond secured
only by a deposit of a sum of money not exceeding ten percent of the total
amount of the undertaking."' T The drafters of New York's revised bail
laws explained that they had two reasons for adding the "partially se-
cured" and unsecured bail bonds to the forms of authorized bail. 8 These
forms of bail do not relax the amount of bail but they do provide for a
release "somewhere between bail as presently authorized and release on
one's own recognizance." Furthermore, it was hoped that the use of these
forms of bail may furnish a method of reducing the portion of New York's
prison population consisting of unconvicted defendants.
Some of these six states adopted ten percent deposit as part of a statu-
tory adoption of a bail system closely paralleling the Federal Bail Reform
Act; 39 and at least one state utilized court rule making power. 40
A. The Illinois System
The only state that has had extensive experience with ten percent de-
posit as a form of bail is Illinois, which has utilized this form of bail since
1964.111 Most of the other states that have authorized the ten percent de-
posit have done so only in the past two years, and Michigan, which au-
thorized the ten percent deposit in 1966, has used this form of bail spar-
ingly. 4 ' The drafter of the current Illinois bail system has said that,
134 See text supra, at 453.
'
35 ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(b)(4) (Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 763.16 (Supp.
1971); MiCH. COMP. LAWS § 780.66 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7553a (a)(3)
(1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 969.02(2) (a), 969.03(1)(c) (1971); WYo. STAT. ANN.
(Sup. Ct. R. Crim. P.) Rule 8 (Cum. Supp. 1969).
136 N.Y. CnL. PRoc. LAw § 520.10(1)(e) (McKinney 1970).
137 N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 500.10 (18) (McKinney 1970),
1381Proposed N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law, § 385.10 (staff comment) (E. Thompson Co. 1967).
19 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (Supp. 1970).
140 WYo. STAT. ANN. (Sup. Ct Rules of Crim. Proc.) Rule 8 (Cum. Supp. 1969).
141 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (1970).
142 From the authorization in 1966 of ten percent deposit as a form of bail to September of
1970, only 284 ten percent deposit releases in non-traffic cases occurred in the Recorder's Court
of the City of Detroit. Interview with Alex E. Renaud, Chief Bail Bond Bureau, Recorder's.
During a one-year period of 1969, 3,848 surety bond releases were effectuated in the same court
on felony charges alone. 1969 REcORDER's COURT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT ANNUAL RE-
PORT 7 (1969).
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"[t]he ten percent provision is designed to restore the administration of
bail to the courts . . . and to eliminate the private professional bail bonds-
men from the criminal justice administrative processes."' 143 The idea of
the ten percent deposit was borrowed from a practice in some New York
courts to give an accused an option of posting a one thousand dollar bail
bond with commercial sureties or a deposit of one hundred dollars cash
bond.144  The practice was not often used in New York because of court
administrative costs in handling the cash deposit. Illinois included in its
ten percent deposit provision the retention of a small amount for bail
bond costs. The retention of bail bond costs has not been included in
some of the more recent state authorizations of the ten percent deposit as
a form of bail, and continues to be a vexing problem in the adoption of
this form of bail. 45
Bondsmen continued to flourish in Illinois for a few years after the en-
actment of the 1964 bail revision.146  In 1965, the forms of bail described
in the revision became the exclusive method of providing bail 147 and the
legislature limited the use of the ten percent deposit privilege to only "the
person for whom bail has been set." 148  To assure that the professional
bail bondsmen had no relationship with the operation of the ten percent
deposit form of bail, the circuit court in Cook County issued a rule that
required court clerks to deliver receipts for ten percent deposits and to
make refund checks payable only to defendants.149 The last threat to the
operation of ten percent deposit form of bail was removed when the Illi-
nois Supreme Court reduced a bail amount from three hundred thousand
dollars to thirty thousand dollars in a case where the trial judge had chosen
the higher amount to avoid the effect of the ten percent deposit privilege.'50
143 Hearings, supra note 6.
144 Bowman, The Illinois Ten Percent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 35, 37.
145 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (Supp. 1970). Retention of bail bond costs has
been included in the Michigan and Wisconsin statutes. MIC-L STAT. ANN. § 29.872(56)
(1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 969.02, 969.03 (1971). The retention of bail bond cost con-
tinues to be a vexing problem in the use of 10% deposit as a form of bail. It was challenged in
Schille v. Kuebel, 46 Ill.2d 538 264 N.E.2d 377 (1970) on the theory that it creates a discrimi-
natory disparity between a homogenous class in that the bail cost retention does not apply to
persons who provide bail by deposit of the full amount of bail. In addition, it was argued that
retention of bail bond costs was an assessment of costs against a dischargd defendant contrary
to the Illinois constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court, with two Justices dissenting, upheld
the retention of bail bond costs. Id. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear the appeal. 39
U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. April 27, 1971).
146 Oaks & Lehman, The Criminal Process of Cook County and the Indigent Defendant,
1966 U. ILL. L.F. 584, 670.
147 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16, § 51 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971).
148 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 110-7(a), 110-8 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
149 Oaks & Lehman, The Criminal Process of Cook County and the Indigent Defendant,
1966 U. ILL. LF. 584, 673 (1966).
150 People ex. rel. Yocca v. Ogilvie, reported at Kamin, Bail Administration in Illinois,
53 ILL. B.J. 674, 683 (1965).
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Currently, the ten percent deposit form of bail is widely used in Illinois,'
and according to all reports on the operation of the Illinois bail system,
there are presently no professional bail bondsmen.15
When the ten percent deposit legislation was submitted to the Illinois
legislature, bondsmen and representatives of the few surety companies that
specialize in bail bonds argued that the proposal was an asault on private
enterprise and that the default rate on ten percent deposits would be as high
as nine out of every ten releases. According to the bondsmen, the default
rate in ten percent deposit releases would escalate dramatically because de-
fendants, without fear of bondsmen, would not bother to appear.153 The
bondsmen pointed to the low default rate in bail bonds written by them.
In 1962, 51,161 commercial surety bail bonds were written in the Munici-
pal Court of Chicago, and 5,487 forfeited-a forfeiture rate of ten per-
cent.' This forfeiture rate, and subsequent ones pertaining to Cook
County, includes, as forfeitures, cases where the defendant did not appear
at his court appearance date, and his non-appearance continued for thirty
days thereafter.'5 These rates, therefore, do not take into account ap-
pearances after the thirty day period and consequently they appear higher
than other reported forfeiture rates on bondsmen's releases elsewhere in
the country.'56
The bondsmen's arguments could not be completely answered; conse-
quently, the initial enactment in Illinois of the ten percent deposit provi-
sion, effective January 1, 1964, carried an automatic termination date of
August 31, 1965.57 Furthermore, the legislation, although originally pro-
posed for application to all offenses throughout the state, contained a pro-
vision exempting traffic and minor misdemeanor charges punishable by
fine only and those specified by the Illinois Supreme Court.3 8
Despite some confusion in its initial operation, 59 the results of the leg-
islation were excellent and the Illinois legislature re-enacted the ten per-
cent deposit legislation in 1965 without a termination date on the urging
of the judges who had experience with it during its eighteen month
151 See text supra, at 453.
152 Boyle, Bail Under the Judicial Article, 17 DE PAUL L. REv. 267, 271-275 (1968);
Oaks & Lehman, The Criminal Process of Cook County and the Indigent Defendant, 1966
U. ILL. LF. 584, 673 (1966).
153 Bowman, Illinois Ten Percent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 35, 37-38.
154 Boyle, Bail Under the Judicial Article, 17 DEPAUL L REv. 267, 274 (1968).
155 Under Illinois law, a judgment on defaulted bail is entered thirty days after the defen-
dant's non-appearance. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 110-7 (g) (Smith-Hurd 1970).
156 See Murphy, State Control of Professional Bail Bondsmen, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 375,
403 (1967).
157 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
158 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-15 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
159 C. Bowman, Illinois Ten Percent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 35, 38.
[Vol. 32
REVISION OF STATE BAIL LAWS
trial period.1 0  Supporting legislation was also passed, including the re-
quirement that provisions of the law granting the ten percent deposit priv-
ilege be prominently displayed in police stations16' and permitting the de-
posits to be received by peace officers and sheriffs. 16 2
The bondsmen's ominous predictions about the default rates under the
ten percent legislation were wrong. Statistics from the criminal session of
the Municipal District One of the Circuit Court for Cook County-for-
merly the Municipal Court of Chicago-showed that the default rate on
ten percent deposit bonds during its test period from January 1, 1964, to
August 1965, was slightly lower than the ten percent default rate on re-
leases through the services of professional bail bondsmen. 63 The pub-
lished statistics on the experience with ten percent deposit from 1965 to
1967 continued to show a default rate which matched that of bondsmen
releases during the period prior to the demise of bondsmen in Illinois.'
The most recent statistics covering experience with ten percent deposit
in all courts in Cook County for the years 1968 and 1969 show that the
early success in this form of bail has continued. Substantially all bail is-
sues in misdemeanor and felony cases in Cook County are raised for the
first time in the six districts of the Municipal Department of the Circuit
Court for Cook County. 65 The first district has jurisdiction to decide the
final merits of misdemeanor charges occurring in Chicago and to dispose
of preliminary hearings on felony charges also occurring in the city
Jurisdiction over similar matters occurring out of the city but within Cook
County is distributed among districts two through six of the Municipal
Department.
According to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, the fol-
lowing default rates were experienced in the widespread use of ten percent
deposit for the two years ending December 31, 1969.66 These default
rates again match the ten percent default rate in releases effectuated by
bondsmen prior to 1965-a rate which bondsmen had argued was unat-
tainable with ten percent deposit.
160 Kamin, Bail Administration in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 674, 680 (1965).
161 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 103-7 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
102 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16, § 81 (Smith-Hurd 1971).
163 Kamin, Bail Administration in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 674, 680 (1965); Bowman, Illinois
Ten Percent Deposit Provision, 1965 ILL. L.F. 35, 39.
104 Boyle, Bail Under the Judicial Article, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 274-275 (1968).
165 For a complete description of the present structure of the Circuit Court for Cook County
and its antecedent court structures prior to 1965, see Note, Criminal Justice in Extremis: Ad-
ministration of Justice During the April 1968 Chicago Disorder, 36 U. oF CH. L. REV. 455
(1969).
166 Sources: Statistical Report, Dec. 1, 1967 to November 30, 1970, Clerk, Circuit Court of
Cook County, interviews with Peter AL Deuel, Adm. Ass'r. to Clerk, Circuit Court of Cook
County.
1971]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
1968
District 1 Districts 2-6
(City of Chicago) (Cook County
except Chicago)
Number of Ten Percent Deposit Bonds 81,989 25,658
Number of Forfeitures 8,856 3,369
Default Rate 10.7% 13.1%
1969
Number of Ten Percent Deposit Bonds 84,202 27,308
Number of Forfeitures 10,402 2,866
Default Rate 11.7% 10.5%
VI. THE MANAGERIAL ASPECTS OF
STATE BAIL BOND LAWS
In the course of a discussion of legislation permitting the use of notices
to appear by police, it has been suggested that the mere passage of permis-
sive legislation is not sufficient to effectuate the desired change in police
operations. 6' This is especially true of legislative revision of bail bond
laws. The recent legislative revisions that have taken place in some states
and in the District of Columbia seem detached from reality when the prom-
ise of the legislation is compared with the actual operation of the revised
bail bond laws. This is illustrated by the fate of state and federal bail
legislation selecting "release on own recognizance" 68 or "release on unse-
cured bond" as the presumptive form of bail and by the early experience of
Illinois ten percent deposit legislation.169
A. Presumptive Release on Own Recognizance
Perhaps some of the most poorly drafted provisions in state criminal
codes are those dealing with bail. The form of bail which functionally
operates as a release of a defendant without any prior financial cost is
called "release on own recognizance"'170 or release on "personal bond,"""1
or release on "unsecured appearance bond." 7- Pennsylvania enacted in
1966 a unique form of bail called "nominal bail,"173 which was bail se-
cured by one dollar conditioned by the defendant as principal and an
official designated by the court as surety. According to the drafters, this
was intended to replace the system of releasing a defendant on his own
167 LaFave, Alternatives to the Present Bail System, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 8, 13.
168 See Appendix II for a compilation of state statutory authorization for the release of de-
fendants on their own recognizance.
169 See text sup-ra p. 453.
170 See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.20 (Page Supp. 1970).
171 See, e.g., TEx CODE CRIM. PROC art. 17.04 (1966).
172 IOWA CODE ANN. § 763.16 (Supp. 1971); WYO. STAT. ANN. (Sup. Ct. Rules) Rule 8
(Supp. 1969).
173PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 4001(b), 4007 (Supp. 1971).
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recognizance and to include a nominal surety who could apprehend a defen-
dant across state lines without the necessity of extradition proceedings. 174
In actual operation, nominal bail, at least in Philadelphia, has been trans-
formed into a release without surety which directly contradicts the in-
tention of the legislature.' 75  This has happened for the reason that the
possible candidates for "nominal surety," such as court clerks, hesitated to
indulge in the practice of private retrievers of fugitive defendants-a prac-
tice in which the limits of legal responsibility are unclear.
The New York Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Crimi-
nal Code said that the New York bail laws were "virtually unintelligible
and, in their entirety ...present a chaotic scheme that defies summary
and analysis."' 17 ' The commission proposed "a fresh . . .phraseological
approach"'177 and developed a general definitional section of fifteen def-
initions, about one third of the general definitions applying to the ten
articles of the Uniform Commercial Code. 8
Although the etymology and present meanings of the phrase "release
on own recognizance" have been stated elsewhere, 79 a brief statement of
the change in meaning of a "release on own recognizance" illustrates the
confusion in language that currently describes state bail systems. At
common law such a release meant a release based upon a formal acknowl-
edgment by a person that he owed a sum of money to the state, made "in
the presence of some court or magistrate, with a condition that such ac-
knowledgment shall be void upon the appearance of the party, his good
behavior, or the like ... ,,180 A recognizance release and a release on a
bail bond, although different in the manner of execution and enforcement
of the money obligation, 81 were alike in that both involved an obliga-
tion to pay money if the accused did not appear. Critics of the bail sys-
tem then began to use the phrase "release on own or personal recogniz-
ance" to designate a release based simply on a promise to appear.' 82  In
the effort to aid the indigent in the bail system, recognizance releases were
emphasized to obviate the necessity of a commercial or other surety, but
in the process, the nature of a recognizance as a money obligation seems
174 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 4007 (staff comment) (Supp. 1971).
175 Discussion with Erwin Lodge, Clerk, Court of Quarter Sessions sitting in Philadelphia,
Penn.
176 Proposed New York Crim. Proc. Law. Staff Comment to Tide V, Release on Recogniz-
ance and Bail at p. 424 (E. Thompson Co., N.Y. 1967).
177 Id.
178 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (1962 official text).
170 Murphy, State Control of the Operation of Professional Ball Bondsmen, 36 U. CON.
L REV. 375, 410 (Appendix II) (1967).
180 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 928 (Lewis ed. 1900).
1812 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 802 (Lewis ed. 1900); see RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 9 (1932). For a discussion of the origin of recognizance, see 2 F. POLLACK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 203-204 (2d ed. 1968).
182 D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964, at 62 (1964).
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to have been forgotten. Some recently enacted state statutes authorizing
release on own recognizance dearly change the common law meaning of
a recognizance as a formally executed money obligation.8 3 Other states,
such as Ohio, have also recently enacted release on own recognizance
statutes' 84 but have failed to deal with the meaning of this type of release.
The result is a difference between what the state statutes say and what the
state courts do. For example, although Ohio bail statutes refer to "rec-
ognizance" as an undertaking to forfeit a sum set as bail, 8 5 the practice
of many Ohio courts is to treat the release on own recognizance statute as
authorizing release on a promise to appear without any money obligation.
The language difficulties in revision of bail bond laws dealing with
nonfinancial releases, such as recognizance releases, are slight when com-
pared with the problems of implementing legislative intent expressed in
the revision. In this regard, the drafters should take care to understand
how the bail system is in fact managed in the state or else elements of
the revision may amount to a superficial statutory cast set over a bail sys-
tem that does not change. Experience with presumptive release on own
recognizance statutes illustrate this point.
One of the elements of the 1964 bail revision in Illinois was an author-
ization for release of an accused on his own recognizance which contained
a statement of legislative intent as part of the statutory language: "This
Section shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of relying
upon criminal sanctions instead of financial loss to assure the appearance
of the accused."' 8 6 Despite claims of "liberal use of release upon recog-
nizance" as an accomplishment of the Illinois bail system,187 release on
own recognizance is used in only four percent of the pre-trial releases in
Illinois. Under the Illinois statutory scheme of bail, release can occur
through release on own recognizance,188 ten percent deposit,189 or deposit
of cash, stock, bonds or real estate valued at the bail amount. 90 Statistics
from the operation of the seven districts within the Municipal Department
of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that release on own recogni-
zance is seldom used.
The monetary releases through cash bail or ten percent deposit, taken to-
gether, account for ninety-six percent of the releases despite the Illinois
legislative intention to minimize monetary sanctions for non appearance.
183 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1318.4 (1970).
184 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2937.29 (Page Supp. 1970).
185 E.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2937.22 (C), 2937.36 (C) (Page Supp. 1970).
186 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
18 7 Boyle, Bail Under the Judicial Article, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1967).
188 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
189 ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 38, § 110-7 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
190 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-8 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
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District 1 (Chicago)
1968
Ten Percent Release on
Cash Bail Deposit Own Recognizance
Number of Releases 138,909 81,989 10,547
Percentage of Total Releases 60.0% 35.4% 4.6%
1969
Number of Releases 139,052 84,202 9,777
Percentage of Total Releases 59.7% 36.1% 4.2%
Districts 2-6 (Cook County other than Chicago)
1968
Ten Percent Release on
Cash Bail Deposit Own Recognizance
Number of Releases 51,258 26,865 3,584
Percentage of Total Releases 62.7% 32.9% 4.4%
1969
Number of Releases 55,301 30,001 4,199
Percentage of Total Releases 61.8% 33.5% 4.7%
The reason for this frustration of legislative intent is two-fold. First,
through a combination of a bail schedule with pre-set bail sums for certain
misdemeanors'91 and the power of police officers to take bail in its mone-
tary forms of cash or ten percent deposit,192 the interest of an accused in
obtaining release after arrest without delay can be served only through
the monetary forms of bail. In felony cases, there is the potential for use
of release on own recognizance in that judicial intervention is necessary
prior to the release for bail setting purposes, which intervention includes
the possibility of ordering a release on own recognizance. But the courts,
including the all night bail bond court in Chicago, seldom exercise this
power.0 3  The courts' reluctance has a reasonable basis in that, except for
a small program commenced by the Circuit Court for Cook County,1 4 there
is no administrative mechanism available to the court for verifying the
defendant's community connections through residence, employment, or
family ties, or for reinforcing the defendant's court appearance obligation
by notification and contact during the release period. This contrasts with
191 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-15 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
10 2 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-9 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
193 For a brief description of the night bail bond court, see Boyle, Bail Under the Judicial
Article, 17 DEPAUL L. REv. 267, 270 (1968). By the author's observation of the operations of
the bail bond court and a review of its recent docket, it appears that release on own recogniz-
ance is currently occurring in approximately one out of every twenty-five cases.
104 The program was commenced on August 15, 1968. Interviews are limited to those who
had an opportunity to be released through one of the two forms of monetary releases, failed to
do so, and are imprisoned. Apparently there is no contact maintained with the defendant dur-
ing the release or mechanism for notification of court appearance date. Memorandum by
Marshall J. Pidgeon to the Circuit Court for Cook County dated February 26, 1971.
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the tie of the defendant to his court appearance in the cash or ten percent
deposit release arising out of the prospect of the return of the security.
A similar situation exists, apparently, in the District of Columbia
through the combined effect of a bail schedule and the power of the pre-
cinct police lieutenant, acting as a deputy clerk for the federal or District
of Columbia court, to accept a monetary form of bail. One interesting as-
pect is that the police, in contrast with the Illinois practice, will generally
accept only a bail bond with commercial surety, which means that bonds-
men continue to have a large role in effectuating the accused's interest in
release without delay after arrest. 9 5
In some parts of Ohio, such as Cincinnati, the effect of a local bail
schedule extending to misdemeanors and-perhaps invalidly9 6-to fel-
onies, combined with the power of the clerk to receive bail in the scheduled
amount, has sharply reduced the application of Ohio's recently enacted
release on own recognizance statute. The clerk's office is open twenty-four
hours a day to facilitate speedy monetary release after arrest. Although
not limited in its terms to indigents, the statute seems to be applied largely
to persons who could not obtain their monetary release shortly after arrest
and who, consequently, are forced to remain in jail to await the court's
decision on release on own recognizance.197
B. Individualization of the Bail Issue
The central issue in the release on own recognizance statutes and other
noncommercial releases is the extent to which the bail issue in criminal
cases in state courts should be individualized both as to the amount and
form of bail. The issue involves a crossfire of competing interests on both
the level of the individual defendant and of the state. From the perspec-
tive of the accused, there is the interest in release as soon as possible after
arrest and the necessary police processing. This has been satisfied by the
extensive use of bail schedules and the common state statutory extension of
power to court clerks or police to receive monetary bail. There is no fac.
tual investigation for bail intervening between arrest and release and the
clerk or the police are usually available on a twenty-four hour basis to re,
ceive monetary bail. In this system, the booking officer or the court clerk
merely consults his list, locates the name of the charge and advises the
defendant of the pre-set amount of bail. There is no inquiry into the back-
ground of the defendant, family or community ties, employment record,
195 Information obtained from Bruce D. Beaudin; Director, District of Columbia Bail
Agency.
196The statutory authority establishing a bail schedule is contained in Orno REV. CODE
ANN. § 2937.23 (Page Supp. 1970) and seems to apply only to misdemeanors.
19 7 See generally Murphy, State Control of the Operations of Professional Bail Bondsmen,
36 U. CIN. L. REv. 375, 406-407 (1967).
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or record of prior failures to appear. Bail is set solely according to the
charge.
Competing against this interest in speedy release is the constitutional
interest of all defendants to an opportunity to have a hearing on the bail
issue and the constitutional interest of indigents to have equal treatment in
the application of state bail laws. It was on the basis of both these inter-
ests that a federal court recently held that a bail schedule in Dade County,
Florida, violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution.19" Ackies v. Purdy,:99
was a class action against the County Public Safety Director on the theory
that the county bail schedule as administered by the Director and his
agents violated the plaintiff's constitutional right to a hearing, to equal ap-
plication of the bail laws, and to have reasonable bail set.200 The court
found from the statistical files of the state court that if a defendant cannot
afford the bond set in the schedule he remains in jail from three days to
three weeks before a judicial appearance and that the resultant incarcera-
tion of indigents definitely causes an overcrowding of jail facilities. Dur-
ing a two year period, "a minimum of 680 persons were incarcerated in
the Dade County Jail because of their inability to post the master bail
bond for approximately 30 days between the time of arrest and their first
appearance before a judicial officer." 201
Based upon Goldberg v. Kelly,=2 the court held that the plaintiff's right
to a hearing before being deprived of liberty for periods of days or weeks
was violated by the operation of the bail schedule. With respect to the
equal protection issue, the court applied the more active standard of judi-
cial review developed by the Supreme Court in reviewing state limitations
on voting rights20 3 and travel.20 4 The Ackies court held that complete loss
of personal liberty for days or weeks for the group of defendants who
could not afford the scheduled bail was a "fundamental interest" of the
plaintiffs which could be restricted by the operation of the state bail sched-
ule only if a compelling state interest supported the restriction. The
court found no such state interest and noted that, "A poor man with strong
ties in the community may be more likely to appear than a man with some
cash and no community involvement." 205
The relief shaped by the court reflects other interests at stake in the
question of the use of bail schedules and the extent to which a state must
198 Ackies v. Purdy, 322 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
190 Id.
200 The action was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. §
1343(3).
2 01 Ackies v. Purdy, 322 F. Supp. 38, 40 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
20' 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
203 See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
204 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
2 05 Ackies v. Purdy, 322 F. Supp. 38, 42 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
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individualize the bail issue in the operation of its bail laws. The court
realized that total elimination of the bail schedule in a state bail system
with large numbers of criminal cases would result in jailing of a large
number of people with finances, at least overnight or until brought before
a magistrate for a release hearing. These people had been able to obtain
immediate freedom after arrest through use of the bail schedules and the
court was "not disposed toward forcing these people to remain in jail" so
that all defendants could be afforded the privilege of a release hearing m
The court ordered that the bail schedule could operate only if the accused
is first informed of his right to a bail hearing without unnecessary delay
and thereafter the accused voluntarily waives this right.
Another problem, not mentioned by the Ackies court, is the cost to the
state of more extensive individualization of bail, particularly with respect
to nonfinancial releases such as release on own recognizance. In contrast
with cash bail or ten percent deposit with the prospect of return of the
cash or deposit on court appearance, there is little to tie the defendant in a
nonfinancial release to his court appearance unless there is a system of con-
tact with the defendant or, at minimum, a notification. This is best illus-
trated by the growing pains of the District of Columbia Bail Agency, 07
created by Congress as the administrative investigative agency to facilitate
court use of the Federal Bail Reform Act. A Judicial Council Committee
appointed hy Chief Judge Bazelon was appointed in 1968 to study bail
operations in the District. The report of the committee recommended that
the Bail Agency be "drastically expanded to enable it to provide reports
that would be more detailed and more thoroughly verified for bail setting
magistrates; to provide notice of court appearances; and to supervise pre-
trial releases." 208  Another 1970 judicial study recommended expansion of
the Bail Agency "as the first and most important step to be taken to effec-
tuate efficient administration of the (Bail Reform) Act."" 0 In June of
1970, the Bail Agency expanded its staff and opened its office on a twenty-
four hour basis, seven days a week, thereby sharply increasing its 1969
budget of $116,000.1o
Recent state bail reform tends to borrow from the Federal Bail Reform
Act with the requirement that the bail hearing take into account commu-
nity ties and the options of conditional release. This is likely to be a paper
accomplishment, particularly with nonfinancial releases, if the necessary ad-
ministrative mechanisms are not available to the courts for investigation
and verification of community ties and minimal contact with the defendant
20 Id.
207 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-901 et. seq. (1967).
208 Reaudin, Bail i the District-What It Was; Is; and Will Be. 20 AM. U. L. RLEV. 432,
436 (1971).
209 Id. at 438.
2 10 District of Columbia Bail Agency, Third Annual Report.
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during release. The lesson of five years of operation of the Federal Bail
Reform Act shows that efficient administration of the Act is possible only
with the supporting administrative agency.
One method of individualizing the pre-trial release issue is not in the
realm of bail but that of arrest. This involves expansion of the "arrest-
notice" power of the police in misdemeanor cases. Under such a power,
which exists in some state and city legislation,211 police take custody of the
individual, complete the necessary booking and identification processes, and
then have the power to release the defendant with a notice to appear.
Use of the arrest-notice power by the police on a systematic basis with
excellent results has been reported in different parts of the country.212
Under some legislation 213 authorizing arrest-notice, the police must take
into account the same factors, such as community ties, which are usually
examined by a magistrate for purposes of deciding a release on own rec-
ognizance. The advantage of the arrest-notice power in the case of indi-
gents charged with misdemeanors is that the arrest-notice release eliminates
the delay involved in bringing the defendant before the court for a release
based on nonfinancial forms of bail, such as release on own recognizance.
The similarity in factual inquiry on the question of arrest-notice re-
lease by police immediately after misdemeanor arrest and on the question of
release on own recognizance by the court, usually with some delay after
arrest, has led the Bail Agency in the District of Columbia to assist the
police by interviewing and verifying information about indigent defen-
dants. In 1969, one thousand eighty-four persons were referred to the
Bail Agency by the District police, and five hundred sixty-two were rec-
ommended for release. The Agency is urging more systematic implemen-
tation of arrest-notice. 214
APPENDIX I
Statutory Authorization for Bondsmen's Arrest Power
1. The following states do not provide statutory authority for a bondsman to
arrest an accused:
Alaska
New Jersey
South Carolina
Maryland
Illinois
211 See, e.g., Cindnnati, Ohio Code § 903-4, § 903-5 (1956); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §
107-12 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
212 Note, An Alternative to the Bail System: Penal Code Section 853.6, 18 HASTINGS L.J.
643 (1967).
213 See, e.g., Cincinnati, Ohio Code § 903-5 (1956).
214 District of Columbia Bail Agency, Third Annual Report (1969). See Beaudin, Bail
in the District of Columbia, 20 AM. U. L REv. 432 (1971).
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2. The following states provide express statutory authority for a bondsman to
arrest the accused:
Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§ 209, 210 (1959).
Arkansas: ARuK. STAT. ANN. § 43-718 (1964).
California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1301 (West 1970).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 903.22, .29 (Supp. 1971).
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 19-2925 (1948).
Indiana: IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-316 (1968); § 9-3730 (1970).
Iowa: IOWA CODE § 768.2 (1950).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2809 (Supp. 1970).
Kentucky: Ky. R. CRim. P. 4.24 (1969).
Louisiana: LA. CODE Ciam. PRO. ANN. art. 340 (West 1967).
Michigan: hcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.913 (1954).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 629.63 (1947).
Montana: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-1115 (1969).
Nevada: NEv. REv. STAT. § 178.526 (1969).
North Carolina: N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-122 (Supp. 1969).
North Dakota: N. D. CENT. CODE § 29-08-20 (1960).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1107 (1958); tit. 59, § 1329 (1971).
Oregon: ORE. REv. STAT. § 140.420 (1969).
Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. tit. 19, § 53 (1964).
South Dakota: S. D. CODE § 23-26-9 (1969).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1227 (1955).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-43-22 (1953).
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-144 (1960).
Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. § 969.14 (1971).
3. The following states have statutory authority enabling bondsmen to sur-
render the body of the accused to the court or a law enforcement official. The bonds-
men's power of arrest can be reasonably implied from these provisions:
Arizona: Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405 (1956).
Colorado: COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-2-18 (1964).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-65 (1960).
Delaware: DEL. SUPER. CT. (Camr.) R. 46 (g).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 27-904 (1953).
Hawaii: HAWAI REv. LAws § 709-14 (1968).
Maine: ME. R. CIUM. P. 46 (F) (1970).
Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 68 (Supp. 1971); § 69
(1968).
Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 2493, 2494 (1957).
Missouri: Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 544.600, .610 (1953).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29.905, .906 (1965).
New Hampshire: N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 597:27, :28 (Supp. 1970).
New Mexico: N. M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-20, -22 (1953).
New York: N. Y. Cvim. PROC. LAW § 530.80 (McKinney 1970).
Ohio: Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 2937.36 (Page Supp. 1970).
Rhode Island: R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 12-13-18, -19 (Supp. 1970).
Texas: TEx. CODE Caom. PRoc. ANN. art. 17.16 (1966).
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 7560, 7570 (1958).
Washington: WASH. Rav. CODE § 10.19.105 (1961).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1C-12 (1966).
Wyoming: Wyo. R. Cium. P. 8 (e) (5) (Supp. 1969).
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APPENDIX II
State Legislative Authorization of Release on Own Recognizance
1. In the following states, authorization to release on own recognizance was
part of a major revision of the state bail laws paralleling the Federal Bail Reform
Act thereby, making release on own recognizance the presumptive form of bail:
Alaska
Arizona
Iowa
Kansas
South Carolina
Vermont
Wyoming
2. At least thirty-six states have enacted statutes authorizing release of de-
fendants on their own recognizance:
Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 187 (1959).
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (1970).
Arizona: Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1577 (Supp. 1970).
California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1318 (West 1970).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-17-12 (1966).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-la (Supp. 1971).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2104 (Supp. 1969).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.03 (2) (a) 3 (Supp. 1971).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 27-911 (Supp. 1970).
Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (1970).
Iowa: IOWA CODE § 763.16 (Supp. 1971).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2802 (Supp. 1970).
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.15 (1967);
LA. CODE Cmf. PRO. ANN. art. 336 (West Supp. 1971).
Maine: ME. R. Ciuan. P. 46 (d) (1970).
Maryland: ID. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 638A (1971).
Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, § 58 (Supp. 1971).
Michigan: MjICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.872 (52) (Supp. 1971).
Minnesota: HENNEPIN CTY. MUN. CT. (Crim.) R. 35.
Montana: MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-1106 (1969).
Nevada: NEv. REv. STAT. § 178.502 (1969).
New Hampshire: N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 597:1 (Supp. 1970).
New Mexico: N. M. STAT. ANN. § 36-6-6 (Supp. 1969).
New York: N. Y. C fhM. PROC. LAW §§ 530.10-.40 (McKinney 1970).
North Carolina: N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-103.1 (Supp. 1969).
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.29 (Page Supp. 1970).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1334 (1971).
Oregon: ORE. REV. STAT. § 140.720 (1969).
South Carolina: S. C. CODE ANN. § 17-300 (Supp. 1970).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2123 (Supp. 1970).
Texas: TEx. CODE CIf. PROC. art. 17.03 (1966).
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7553a (Supp. 1970).
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-110 (Supp. 1970).
Washington: WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 3.50.220 (Supp. 1970).
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West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1C-4 (1966).
Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 969.02, .03 (1971).
Wyoming: Wyo. R. CiUM. P. 8 (c) (Supp. 1969).
